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Shortly after the Supreme Court’s controversial 
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, then-President Obama declared in 
his 2010 State of the Union Address that the 
Court had “reversed a century of law” in 
overturning limitations on independent corporate 
expenditures.  In one sense, this is clearly true.  
The Tillman Act, passed in 1907 at the urging of 
Theodore Roosevelt, marked the first legislative 
attempt to limit the influence of corporations in 
political elections.  
In a larger sense, however, Citizens United 
served as the culmination of two hundred years 
of jurisprudence defining the rights of the 
corporate person.  Starting from the ancient 
origins of corporate personality, this project 
traces the bases for Citizens United through a 
series of landmark cases, from Chief Justice 
Marshall’s famous description of the corporation 
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodard 
(1819) to the twin pillars of Buckley v. Valeo
(1976) and First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti (1978).  Further, in doing so, it seeks to 
demonstrate that the standards established in 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) 
were rightly overturned in Citizens United, as 
said standards were fundamentally out-of-step 
with the principles of corporate rights and First 
Amendment protection outlined by the Court in 
centuries prior.
• Artificial personhood: The idea of operating 
under a collective identity has origins as old as 
ancient Assyria but first took hold in Roman law.1
The term persona ficta was later coined by Pope 
Innocent IV in his canonization of the law on the 
Roman collegia, which he observed had been 
able to swear oaths on their own behalf.2
• Perpetual life: Inspired by the use of a similar 
tactic by Athenian religious associations,3 the 
idea of distinct personhood was borrowed and 
combined with the notion of perpetual life by the 
English medieval church as a mechanism to 
maintain its property while still preserving some 
control over the church body, after the death of 
church leadership.4
• Limited liability: The risks and capital-intensive 
nature of mercantilism during the colonial era 
ensured that the only way to raise the necessary 
funds was to ensure investors some protection.5
• By the 1930s, it was clear that the freedom of the 
press also belonged to the corporate press.14
• Shortly thereafter, it was made clear that the 
freedoms of speech and press were reserved 
even for non-citizens. 15
• During the Civil Rights Era, the NAACP, as a 
corporation, successfully defended its right to 
association.16
• Bellotti declared explicitly that corporations have 
a 1st Amendment right to protected speech.  
Notably, the Court added that it could find no 
support “for the proposition that speech that 
otherwise would be within the protection of the 
First Amendment loses that protection simply 
because its source is a corporation that cannot 
prove, to the satisfaction of a court, a material 
effect on its business or property.”17
• However, Bellotti’s footnote 26 left open the 
possibility that “Congress might well be able to 
demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or 
apparent corruption in independent expenditures 
by corporations to influence candidate 
elections,” without otherwise approaching the 
question itself.18
Contrary to the insistences of its 
detractors, Citizens United marked a 
faithful return to a longstanding trend in 
jurisprudence of protecting those rights of 
the corporate person “confer[red] upon” or 
“incidental to its very existence” Speech, 
even beyond any immediate interest in 
preserving property, is one such incidental 
right, and, as confirmed by Buckley, said 
speech may, in some cases, take the form 
of independent campaign expenditures.
IV. Independent Campaign Expenditures
• Dartmouth College marked the first expansive 
judicial attempt to define the corporation, holding 
it to be “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, 
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being 
the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation 
confers upon it either expressly or as incidental 
to its very existence.”6
• In the first corporate 14th Amendment case, 
corporations were determined not to be subject 
to the Privileges and Immunities Clause.7
• In a flurry of Gilded Age cases, corporations were 
determined to have equal protection,8 due 
process,9 and search and seizure rights10 but not 
a right against self-incrimination11 nor a part in 
the 14th Amendment right to liberty.12
• Pierce clarified this lack of a corporate right to 
liberty to allow for cases involving the “business 
and property for which they claim protection.”13
• The first three occasions corporate (or union) 
campaign expenditures came before the Court, 
the Court avoided the question, deciding each 
case on narrower grounds.19
• Buckley subtly introduced the idea that political 
campaign-related expenditures were a form of 
speech, drawing from a judicial tradition of 
considering various activities as speech 
equivalents.20
• In doing so, Buckley struck down limits on 
independent expenditures—but although 
corporations were parties to the case, it did not 
explicitly decide the corporate question.21
• A decade later, the Court invalidated restrictions 
on independent expenditures for a narrow set of 
non-profit corporate entities.22
• However, in Austin, the Court opted to uphold 
limits on for-profit corporations’ independent 
expenditures, citing the “state-conferred 
advantages of the corporate structure” and the 
potential for corruption.23 This reasoning was 
later echoed in McConnell.24
• In 2010, the Court in Citizens United overturned 
Austin, citing the line of precedent prior to it.25
